A need for a default-deny-all and then select what a process needs is the better security granularity.
This default-ALLOW-all is too problematic for today's (and future) security needs.
Cuts down on the compliance paperworks too.
> The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by mandatory access control).
Which permissions and authorizations can be delegated?
DAC is the out of the box SELinux configuration for most Linux distros; some processes are confined, but if the process executable does not have the necessary extended filesystem attribute labels the process runs unconfined; default allow all.
You can see which processes are confined with SELinux contexts with `ps -Z`.
MAC is default deny all;
MAC: Mandatory Access Control: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control
Does not help when the SELinux source text file is not buildable by function/procedure axiom: it is at its grittiest granularity, which ironically is the best kind of security, but only if composed by the most savviest SELinux system admins.
Often requires full knowledge of any static/dynamic libraries and any additional dynamic libraries it calls and its resource usages.
Additional frontend UI will be required to proactively determine suitability with those dynamic libraries before any ease of SELinux deployment.
For now, it is a trial and error in part on those intermediate system admins or younger.
> [ audit2allow, https://stopdisablingselinux.com/ ]
Applications don't need to be compiled with selinux libraries unless they want to bypass CLI tools like chcon and restorecon (which set extended filesystem attributes according to the system policy; typically at package install time if the package provenance is sufficient) by linking with libselinux.