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France fines Apple €150M for “excessive” pop-ups that let users reject tracking

(arstechnica.com)
249 points sebastian_z | 2 comments | 31 Mar 25 17:38 UTC | HN request time: 0.001s | source
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nottorp ◴[31 Mar 25 17:45 UTC] No.43537683[source]▶
Actually Apple were fined because they don't apply the same standard to their own pop-ups that allow users to reject tracking. On Apple popups you seem to need one click, while on 3rd party popups you need to confirm twice.

So the fine seems to be for treating 3rd parties differently from their own stuff.

They could make their own popups require double confirmation instead...

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tedunangst ◴[31 Mar 25 19:38 UTC] No.43538944[source]▶
I'm actually okay with the Apple Camera app asking me once and the Domino's Pizza app having to ask me twice. Who are the consumers being harmed here?
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arrosenberg ◴[31 Mar 25 19:51 UTC] No.43539089[source]▶
It's anti-competitive. Apple owns the platform and is giving preference to it's own apps on that platform. Every non-Apple app that competes with an Apple app is harmed.
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st3fan ◴[31 Mar 25 21:18 UTC] No.43540088[source]▶
This is not what this case is about.
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arrosenberg ◴[31 Mar 25 21:40 UTC] No.43540282[source]▶
Seems like it’s roughly what it is about. Apple has a mandatory consent, but won’t adapt it so that third party apps can integrate their own tracking consent into it. As a result third party apps are treated differently than first party because they have one fewer consent screen. That advantages entrenched incumbents with big, locked-in user bases and disadvantages new entrants. Since Apple owns the platform, it’s anticompetitive to pass regulations (which is what Apple is doing here) that discriminate against other participants in a way that acts as a competitive advantage.
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dkga ◴[31 Mar 25 22:02 UTC] No.43540448[source]▶
Yes, but are consumers that knowingly bought into the Apple ecosystem harmed?
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overfeed ◴[31 Mar 25 22:13 UTC] No.43540544{3}[source]▶
Consumers are only part of the competition equation. I bet consumers also love the initial phases of dumping, but regulators have to look beyond short-term consumer preferences.
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abduhl ◴[31 Mar 25 23:45 UTC] No.43541279{4}[source]▶
Regulators don’t have to look beyond short term consumer preference (or rather, consumer benefit) with respect to dumping actually, because only the long term aspect of dumping (when prices are raised on consumers after driving competitors out of the market) is illegal. A company is free to burn as much capital as it wants while it is trying to enter and take over a market.
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overfeed ◴[01 Apr 25 00:53 UTC] No.43541704{5}[source]▶
What mechanism can the regulators use to prevent competition going out of business while maintaining the artificially low prices? Ban price hikes after the competition is dead? What if the dumper decides to leave the market entirely after destroying the competition? [see Walmart leaving small towns, and the resulting food deserts].

The more proactive approach is tractable since it preserves competition (easy) instead of low prices (hard, on shakier legal footing)

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abduhl ◴[01 Apr 25 03:36 UTC] No.43542583{6}[source]▶
What mechanism can the regulators use to prevent potential dumpers from entering a market? Setting price controls on the entire economy? What if the market is currently beholden to a decentralized monopoly with artificially high prices? [see taxis and the arguments people made for Uber’s existence despite it being an obvious dumping operation]

The more proactive approach requires an omniscient regulator that you hope preserves competition but really can only guarantee current prices and incumbent profits.

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overfeed ◴[01 Apr 25 05:27 UTC] No.43543136{7}[source]▶
> What mechanism can the regulators use to prevent potential dumpers from entering a market?

The legal system, including the discovery process, and basic accounting to calculate when the selling price is lower than BoM cost.

Now it's your turn to answer my earlier question.

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1. abduhl ◴[01 Apr 25 12:18 UTC] No.43545858{8}[source]▶
> The legal system, including the discovery process, and basic accounting to calculate when the selling price is lower than BoM cost.

So price controls is your answer? The Costco rotisserie chicken is illegal monopolization in your world.

> What mechanism can the regulators use to prevent competition going out of business while maintaining the artificially low prices?

The legal system, including the equitable power to split up companies under antitrust law.

There is a reason that the proactive approach has been roundly rejected by courts in the modern day, despite Lina Khan’s best efforts to push it. Despite your comment earlier about preserving competition being “easy” (preserving competition via regulation is never easy) and preserving low costs being “hard” and on “shakier legal footing,” the test for antitrust remains consumer harm, not competition.

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2. overfeed ◴[02 Apr 25 20:54 UTC] No.43561441[source]▶
> The legal system, including the equitable power to split up companies under antitrust law.

And how well has this been working out? There hasn't been a real threat of forced divesture since Microsoft's anti-trust case back in the 1990s, and large companies are willing to pay fines that are dwarfed by the profits earned from destroyed competition. How does paying a fine undo consumer harm?