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312 points campuscodi | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.252s | source
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Diggsey ◴[] No.43375000[source]
I recently had to implement SAML and this headline does not surprise me in the slightest.

The SAML spec itself is fairly reasonable, but is built upon XML signatures (and in turn, XML canonicalization) which are truly insane standards, if they can even be called such.

Only a committee could produce such a twisted and depraved specification, no single mind would be capable of holding and combining such contradictory ideas.

It would be so simple to just transmit signatures out-of-band and SAML would be a pleasure to implement.

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TZubiri ◴[] No.43375725[source]
Is SSO salvageable at all? It seems like the idea of just logging into different accounts is fine.

Also just the idea of connecting your accounts together such that you can get megacompromised is foundationally riskier

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1. unscaled ◴[] No.43376167[source]
SAML is not the only standard for SSO. Before SAML we had Kerberos and nowadays you can use Open ID Connect. Other standards can have their own gotcha, but SAML is uniquely horrendous.

When we get vulnerabilities in the SSO protocol (SAML or otherwise) these vulnerabilities generally only affect some of the clients (identity consumers) who have implemented the protocol incorrectly or are using a feature that the provider has implemented incorrectly. Vulnerabilities that break the entire provider are less common.

When comparing this situation to having multiple different accounts, I can't see how SSO is less secure. Sure, when you have breach that affects the entire identity provider the damage is high, but the risk of having a breach (any breach!) is lower, since implementations are fewer, more consolidated and usually developed by people with better expertise.