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189 points arjvik | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.575s | source
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acheong08 ◴[] No.42733994[source]
I don't understand why anyone would use passwordless disk encryption. It just seems inherently vulnerable, especially with the threat model of physical compromise.

Entering a password on boot isn't even that much work

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jrockway ◴[] No.42739068[source]
It's always felt like the best way to lock myself out of my own machine. While I don't really keep any important data on it that's not backed up, I also don't build my workstation image from a config file or anything, so some time will be lost. The thing that's always bugged me is that before AMD had a TPM built into the CPU, the TPM was just a poorly-secured dongle hanging off the motherboard (at least with Asus motherboards) and it just seems like something that's going to break randomly. That breaks, then what. Meanwhile, the CPU owning the keys also doesn't feel great. Sometimes you swap your CPU and now there is an 800 step process to disable decryption before you do that, which is certain to be forgotten as you excitedly unpack your new CPU purchase. (Even if you're completely rebuilding the computer, the number of times I've put a new disk into a new build is approximately zero.)

Just typing a passphrase at boot seems like a pretty decent compromise. I've done it for years and it's never caused a problem.

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1. vladvasiliu ◴[] No.42740057[source]
I sympathize with your points, especially rebuilding the box from scratch.

But all the “passwordless” schemes I’ve seen support at least an additional “master key” which you can type in.

So if you’re ok with the security tradeoffs of passwordless tpm, it’s only an added convenience on top of your approach.