←back to thread

551 points arrdalan | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source

I needed a security camera inside my house, one that would send motion notifications to my smartphone and would allow me to livestream remotely. However, I could not find one that I could trust due to privacy concerns. Many of them upload the plaintext of videos to their servers and none is fully open-source as far as I know. Therefore, I decided to use my spare time to build one from scratch. Called Privastead (as in Private Homestead), it uses OpenMLS for end-to-end encryption (between the camera local hub and the smartphone) and is mostly implemented in Rust (except for part of the Android app that is implemented in Kotlin). The system is functional now and I've been using it in my own house for the past couple of weeks.

Based on some of the discussions I've seen online, it seems like there are other users who are also concerned with the privacy implications of home security cameras. Therefore, I decided to open source my solution for everyone to use. If you need a privacy-preserving home security camera, please give it a try and provide feedback. Note that trying out the system requires you to have a supported IP camera, a local machine connected to the IP camera, a server, and an Android smartphone. I have put together detailed instructions on setting up the system, which I hope makes it easier for others to get the system up and running.

In addition, consider contributing to the project. The prototype currently has a lot of limitations: mainly that it has only been tested with one IP camera, only allows the use of one camera, and only supports Android. I'll continue to improve the prototype as time permits, but progress will be much faster if there are other contributors as well.

Show context
SahAssar ◴[] No.42288089[source]
I'd assume that end-to-end encryption would mean the traffic is encrypted between the camera and the app, which it isn't. That would require an app in the camera to support the system (which could be done on many cameras).
replies(2): >>42288568 #>>42291093 #
arrdalan ◴[] No.42288568[source]
The traffic is encrypted between the hub and the app. The camera is connected to the hub.
replies(1): >>42288613 #
SahAssar ◴[] No.42288613[source]
Right, but the "ends" in end-to-end encryption are typically the device producing the content and the device consuming the content. In this case that is the camera and the app.
replies(1): >>42290608 #
arrdalan ◴[] No.42290608[source]
Correct, that would be even better, but I didn't have control over the camera firmware. Someone mentioned OpenMiko, which I plan to investigate and see if it can allow me to effectively run the hub inside the camera itself and achieve what you are referring to.
replies(1): >>42290719 #
SahAssar ◴[] No.42290719[source]
I'd probably change that in your readme then, this is usually called something like encrypted in-flight or transport encryption.

End-to-end encryption is a pretty specific term and clearly not what is done here. Even if you use protocols designed for end-to-end encryption that does not matter if the protocols talk with an intermediary (the hub) that decrypts the traffic.

For example, if signal still used the signal protocol but decrypted the messages on their server that would not be acceptable to be called end-to-end encryption.

replies(2): >>42292567 #>>42292771 #
1. egberts1 ◴[] No.42292567[source]
Agreed, transport encryption is the term to use for this model which is a great model anyway.

You can use e2e if the data-at-rest (e.g., video) file(s) are also 100% encompassing the encrypted in both the camera and the remote server, as well as the mobile app and remote server.

From the client-side, this E2E means no raw data are exposed over network nor in remote storage and that keys are required to view the raw data at either endpoints.

In today's parlance, the undefined portion of E2E is whether the local storage is encrypted as well. Some will argue on this point. Future may (and should) tighten this E2E as well.