Yi Peng 3 crossed both cables C-Lion 1 and BSC at times matching when they broke

It was crossing right on time for the interruptions, a Russian officer was on board, it slowed down while crossing, no other ships were slowing down in that area during that time (rulingnout headwinds) - it cannot get much clearer. China is now participating in hybrid warfare against Europe (unless they present stronger evidence against this assumption)

So if Trump is against China, and China aligns with Russia, will Trump then support Ukraine? Interesting (and choppy) times ahead.

Even if China doesn't explicitly align with Russia, I believe there are strategic reasons why the US would want a favourable outcome for Ukraine. I outlined a few points in a post a couple of weeks ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42059787

I'm no international relations hawk though, so I'm keen to hear opposing viewpoints.

I agree with what you have said here, but I don't know if the US is in a position to turn the war around in 2024 without a huge escalation. It remains to be seen if there is any possible way to do that without "boots on the ground" (formally starting WW III) or the use of nuclear weapons (again, formally starting WW III).

There were plenty of options to pressure Ukraine into preventing Russia from having a causus belli in early 2022 (too bad the Biden admin didn't do any of those), but those are gone now and Russia currently controls much of the territory they had as military objectives.

Doesn't need to be a huge escalation.

Just enough to send the tide of attrition turning slowly the other way for a while.

After which HN will instantly fill up with comments about "how badly Russia is losing", "it's clear Ukraine has already lost", and so forth.

There were plenty of options to pressure Ukraine into preventing Russia from having a causus belli in early 2022

Russia never had casus belli in this conflict, and no one did anything to present it with such.

I'm not sure Ukraine wins a war of attrition in any meaningful way. Russia is also shockingly good at wars of attrition, and the entire Russian economy has been built around war with the West. Ukraine is a small state in comparison, and they are running out of men, money, and munitions so fast that even tipping the scales by 10x will sink Ukraine before Russia retreats from the territory they now own. In 2022, the goal would be to make it costly to acquire territory so ideas about attrition would have worked a lot better, but it's 2024 and Russia has already grabbed the land. Someone needs to go take it back.

Here's a memo for you on Russia's causus belli. You can claim that they didn't have a legitimate one (I don't think they did), but they had one that got them enough local and international support to work in both 2014 and 2022: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/vladimir-putins-casus-belli-fo...

In your opinion what could Ukraine have done to avoid the causus Belli in 2022?

The causus belli was twofold, and was aimed at the Russian people:

1. Prevention of NATO encroachment toward Russia

2. Protection of ethnic Russians in Donbas

Any and/or all of the following would have weakened or broken Putin's narrative:

1. Stop the military buildup in Donbas that had started in 2021

2. Cease admission of new NATO member states for 3-5 years

3. Stop the process of Ukraine getting closer to NATO and the EU

4. Reduce or stop US military assistance funding to Ukraine

5. Drop the Biden administration's economic sanctions of Russia

6. Continue implementation of the Minsk accords

7. Stop the planned deployments of US missiles to Ukraine

There are many more options. The US administration in 2020 was bringing Ukraine into the fold (because it wanted to be there), but that is not a recipe for peace. NATO had previously agreed not to get close to Ukraine or other states bordering Russia.

The basic flaw in what you're suggesting (that the war could have been averted by mollifying Putin on the terms of his stated narrative), is that, as we both seem to agree, the stated narrative was never the real basis for his decision to invade.

Putin's actual reasons, in turn, seem to have been primarily about:

1. Securing the 3 currently (as of Feb 2022) occupied regions, especially the Crimea, for permanent annexation. Russia's position in the Crimea in particular was at the time severely compromised, due to Ukraine's shutting off of its water access. It also "needed" a land bridge (around the Azov) in order to be reasonably secure in the long term. (We put "needed" in quotes here to remind ourselves that this was the regime's internal desire, not any kind of objective or real "need"). As gravy, or as a way of offsetting the cost for the whole operation, there was also the matter of the Donbas region's significant lithium reserves (estimated at $3T).

2. Permanent deterrence of any NATO bid on Ukraine's part, likely involving some form of formal declaration of permanent neutrality (Finlandization).

3. As gravy, anything it could have also won in terms of regime change in Kyiv, preventing whatever rump state (if any) that remained in Western Ukraine from joining the EU, or simply damaging its chances for success and prosperity generally ("wrecking it", in Mearsheimer's words) would have been a very signicant plus.

The thing is, (2) by itself could have been had without resorting to a full-scale invasion. The West was eager for some kind of deal to end the 2014-2022 conflict, and having Ukraine in NATO was always optional, as far as it was concerned.

But the price for Putin -- forgoing his paramount desire for (1) -- would have been far too high. Plus he thinks of himself as a visionary leader, destined to make his mark on history, and for many years had deluded himself as to Russia's actual capabilities for military adventures of this sort.

So that's why he went "whole hog" in Feb of 2022. The main point here is that there doesn't seem to be much logic in thinking the war could have been avoided by addressing the stated narrative. When Putin's real reasons for invading, with emphasis on (1) above, would be in no way addressed by tactical appeasement of this sort.