The third question is the simplest one.
When the USSR was breaking apart, various parts of it held a referendum on whether to become independent, stay with what's left of the Union, or something else.
Tatarstan held such a referendum in 1992, and 3 out of 5 people have clearly and unambiguously chosen independence. Tatarstan was to become a sovereign state (as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan did).
This didn't happen. The results of the referendum were ignored. Russia has considered Tatarstan its territory ever since.
That highlights another form of bigotry: Russia's infamous referenda, held at gunpoint [12], that are used to give its annexations an air of legitimacy.
That includes Crimea[13]. "Anti-war" Russians are still prone to deferring to that sweet 95% "secede" vote. Even if that referendum were legitimate, curiously, Russians don't have the same overwhelming support of the results of the beyond shadow-of-a-doubt legitimate[14] referendum in Tatarstan.
As Putin's regime slowly eroded Tatarstan's sovereignty to zero, Russians did not object [15].
The question "Whose is Tatarstan" is not controversial by any measure either. It surely belongs to the Tatars, the people who live in Tatarstan.
One can argue that Tatarstan being a part of Russia, in reality, reflects what people of Tatarstan wanted: autonomy, not necessarily independence, secession, sovereignty. And if they did want this, then the current state of things is an acceptable, workable compromise.
It's a valid argument. And it's also valid for Crimea being a part of Ukraine, where it enjoyed an autonomy far stronger than that of Tatarstan today.
It also removes the "not a sandwich" objection, as well as the nonsense about "protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities" in Ukraine that was used as a pretext for the 2022 invasion.
Aside from Russian being under no threat in Ukraine (as half the country still speaks it), surely Russian has never been threatened in Crimea as much as local languages in Tatarstan were outright suppressed.
That's before you realize that Crimea was never Russian in the first place, and today's 90%-ethnic Russian population is the result of the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars, the natives of the peninsula (and, like people of Tatarstan, also Tatars), who were subject to mass deportations during the USSR time, as well as persecution under Russian occupation today.
Crimean Tatars — those who have returned after the deportations and their descendants — aren't big supporters of the annexation.
Tatarstan and Crimea can't be both Russian unless you have double standards on whose votes actually count in Russia.
Or, as Stalin said — who counts the votes.
----
Question #4 is the cherry on top of a pie.
By now, I hope most people are aware that Ukraine was left with one of the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world after its split from the USSR.
The weapons, the planes, and rockets that Ukraine helped build. These weren't "gifts" or "inheritance", as Russian sources like to label this asset.
More of a property you get in a divorce.
Russia wanted it all. And the US — in what Clinton admits was a huge mistake [17] — pushed Ukraine to unilaterally disarm and send its nuclear weapons to Russia [18].
The logic was: the fewer nuclear-armed states, the better; the more stable and safe the world is.
All Ukraine got for its nukes was a security assurance that its sovereignty and territorial integrity will be respected. An assurance signed by the US, the UK — and Russia.
We all know by now that Russia's assurance wasn't worth the paper it's written on. Fewer people take time to think about what it means for the US to give such a promise, and then provide lackluster support that is always on the verge of being withdrawn (and, as far as we can tell, will be). What it means for the world, and nuclear proliferation.
But the real interesting part, to me, is how most Russians see the issue. Regardless of how the war goes, Russians think that of course Russia SHOULD have nuclear weapons.
And equally strongly they feel that Ukraine had NO RIGHT to retain its nuclear weapons, and SHOULD NOT have them going forward either.
It's not a contentious question either. Russians simply don't see Russia without nuclear weapons. They're absolutely essential to its security, even though they have what (was) seen as 2nd strongest army in the world.
Reasoning beyond this point is where things get interesting.
----
Above, I have provided extensive, well sourced explanations of why these for particular questions are important, and what they have to do the the current war that Russia is waging in Ukraine.
These four particular questions were posed by Oleksiy Arestovych, a Ukrainian politician and a former advisor in Zelenskyy's cabinet (now in exile) to Yulia Latynina, a Russian opposition journalist and commentator (also in exile) during one of their semi-regular joint live streams [19].
The subject of the discussion was exactly the question raised by the Russian person we're responding to: to which extent is the average Russian responsible for the invasion their country is perpetrating?
The argument goes, the average Russian never wanted anything bad to happen, why are they seen as a problem? It's their bad government, Putin, whatever! Not them!
The four questions beautifully bring us to reality, in which Putin is actually doing what his citizens want him to do. At least 4 out of 5 on each question.
And when you ask all 4 questions, you'll be hard pressed to find a Russian whose answers would NOT indicate that Russia is still a country that's a threat to its neighbors, and WILL REMAIN ONE for the foreseeable future, because THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY of Russians support Russia's expansion by means of force.
In my experience, the discussion hardly gets past Question #1. Their thinking doesn't proceed past "well it's ours now, so...".
And the questions aren't about any new borders that may or may not be agreed on in the negotiations to come.
The problem is that 4 out 5 Russians don't see the rest of Ukraine any differently than Crimea, and it's just a matter of time before Kyiv will be "returned" to the fold.
And if Kyiv resists, Kyiv will get the Chechnya treatment, and 4 out 5 Russians want it that way.
Whatever elections or referenda happen in Ukraine (or occupied territories), 4 out 5 Russians will consider them legitimate if the results favors Russia, and and illegitimate otherwise.
And most importantly: Russia should always have nuclear weapons, so that it never has to follow any rules. That's the unspoken part, but it doesn't take long to get to.
This is why Ukraine sees Russians (not just the Russian state) as a threat.
This is also why the Russian I asked these questions downvoted me, and left without answering. All the context I told you above — all the links — is everyone's lived memory there.
And four simple questions make them have themselves. At the very least, it's hard for an intelligent person to lie to themselves.
I want to emphasize (again!) that there's nothing apriori contentious or inflammatory about these questions, nor "nationalistic". Here's an answer that shouldn't be hard to swallow:
—The land belongs to the people who live there, and it's to to them to decide. In all cases.
—After the war, Russia will be better off without nuclear weapons — as are Germany and Japan to this day. Taking away the trump card to blackmail the world leaves the next government with no choice but developing the country and its people, not wars and schemes. And if Ukraine could stand to to us without nuclear weapons, we can do that too, if needs be — and with far less sacrifice.
Sadly, that's not the answer I expect to hear.
On that note: dang, I hope you have reached this point in my writing — and I do expect to hear something from you.
Treating the questions I asked as "perpetuating nationalistic flame wars" was unwarranted, disrespectful, and demeaning.
As you can see, there's more depth to the questions than you perceived — and that the ultimate goal of posing them is reconciliation and understanding.
Nobody but Russians can fix Russia. But it's an uphill battle when, after centuries of indoctrination, we expect them to start seeing things differently, and don't even bother explaining what's wrong with that way they are now (that Russians are the problem was a sentiment expressed by others here — which prompted this thread in the first place!).
This thread can and will be helpful to that end. I know many Russians, and the truth is, they are often unaware of their biases, as most of us are. But as long as they have them, the Russian government will exploit them to wage war.
And so many are putting in effort to discover and grow.
Your remark is not helping. At the very least, you could've asked about the subject you can't be as well informed on as those of us whose lives are directly affected by it before judging. It includes the Russian person too —
— and not the random folks who decided to treat as quiz the question not posed to them that they didn't understand.
I expect a response from you. And, if not an apology, then at least a bit of human compassion.
You haven't lost it yet, have you? Asking as a mod.
—Roman Kogan, PhD, Ukrainian.
(References below)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krymnash
[2] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/03/07/navalnys-policy-sh...
[2] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/26/most-russians-supp...
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_green_men_(Russo-Ukrain...
[4] https://www.fpri.org/books/less-know-better-sleep-russias-ro...
[5] https://theintercept.com/2020/06/28/welcome-to-chechnya-gay-...
[6]https://imgur.com/gallery/enby-kyiv-ukraine-jul-sep-2023-fcj...
[7] https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-03/rus...
[8] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/russia-admits-...
[9]https://jamestown.org/program/levadas-last-poll-on-chechnya-...
[10] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/09/my-country-ri...
[11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Tatarstani_sovereignty_re...
[12] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/30/fictitious-annexation-fo...
[13] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/ukraine-russia...
[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/03/23/t...
[15] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/4906
[16] https://verfassungsblog.de/the-legal-status-and-modern-histo...
[17] https://fortune.com/2023/04/05/bill-clinton-ukraine-nuclear-...
[18] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum
[19] https://www.instagram.com/alexey.arestovich/p/Cl4h7WoNP5G/