Pretty much.
Quick things to stash for later for brushing up on those subjects in particular:
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/unity/2021/04/07/civics-101-keep-...
https://www.greece-is.com/learning-from-the-demagogues-of-an...
The problems of today are not novel. Regrettably, we don't do the best job in grinding this info in within the traditional civics education of about a year in the teenage years. The demagogues in particular were a flavor of politician that found their stride "working" the lower parts of the Athenian democracy. The periods in which they were most active were noted for being spikes in instability of the Athenian democracy; even if paired with and consented to by the masses. The context and history of those times were used as foundations for the architecture of the U.S. system of government, in which much of the thinking behind why things were structured in the ways they were arr documented in the Federalist Papers.
The Federalist papers, specifically No. 10 is where Madison touches on the ills of faction, and the inevitable challenge it presents in a government first and foremost concerned with the securing of Liberty. He puts it far better than I. If you read nothing else in the spirit of a civically inclined individual. I beseech you to take the time to peruse the Federalist Papers; hell, hit up the anti-federalist papers too. Be well-rounded! They didn't enter building the foundation of the U.S. blind, neither should we! Start here:
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10
I strongly recommend sticking with copies maintained by the Library of Congress. It can be found elsewhere, but I've run into things online claiming to be documents written by the Founders where the biblio seemed to check out, but the content was massively doctored.
I will include the following excerpts from #10 though; Madison discusses the problem of faction presents to systems of governance specifically applied to the task of preservation of Liberty:
>From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
[TL;DR: Democracies are rife with an excess of sacrificing the individual to the whims of the majority. There is no real check to ensure that the smaller party can be secure in their liberty against a sufficiently motivated quorum. The specific breed of politician here, is indeed, a reference to the demagogues]
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.
[TL;DR] A republic is seen as desirable to democracy due to the quality through which by focusing the duty of operating the governmental function through those with a predisposition or knack for it, it's possible to craft an institutional corpus that can cut through the noise as it were, and get down to the essence of the public good. This theme reoccurs multiple times in the civic architecture of the U.S. The Jury->Judge, the House->the Senate. Each function taking a broad sentiment, then making it some smaller groups entire job to wring out the general vibe to the specific end that best serves the public good. A danger is recognized, however, in that this dynamic admits the chance of danger when this institutional arrangement is co-opted by groups sufficiently motivated and coordinated to attain these levers of power, and employ them to their own ends.
Madison continues enumerating how at least, the republic offers a chance at mitigation of this danger through sufficient diligence on the part of the electorate being on guard against these types of perfidious politician. Tragically, this mechanism doesn't tangibly exist today. The political parties we have today are the embodyment of the supporting institutions/collusive actors that make it possible for perfidious, well-heeled individuals to seize the seats of power rather than being organically elevated to such positions by the collective wisdom embodied in their localities. The Party tells the locality eho to vote for, not the other way around. The Democratic Party (DNC in particular), is a particularly egregious example of this with their reliance on Superdelegates.
Despite the Papers being written in a time long before the Internet ended up supercharging our ability to coordinate over vast distances, where the fastest that info was going to propogate was as a packet by train or horse; much of what they lay out is still eerily prescient today.
If ever you have spare time, the history around these documents is well worth your time.