Thought and language are intertwined in ways we don’t fully grasp. The fact that certain cognitive tasks, like comprehension, can proceed without engaging traditional language-related brain regions doesn't mean thought doesn't use language—it just means we might not yet understand how it does. Thought could employ other forms of linguistic-like processes that Fedorenko's experiments, or even current brain-imaging techniques, fail to capture.
There could be functional redundancies or alternative systems at play that we haven't identified, systems that allow thought to access linguistic capabilities even when the specialized language areas are offline or unnecessary. The question of what "language in thought" looks like remains open, particularly in tasks requiring comprehension. This underscores the need for further exploration into how thought operates and what role, if any, latent or alternative linguistic functionalities play when conventional language regions aren't active.
In short, we may have a good understanding of language in isolation, but not necessarily in its broader role within the cognitive architecture that governs thought, comprehension, and meaning-making.
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