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303 points FigurativeVoid | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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mihaic ◴[] No.41846803[source]
After Godel published his landmark incompleteness proof, that a logical system can't be complete and also without any internal inconsistencies, I would have expected this to trickle into philosophical arguments of this type.

I see no practical usefulness in all of these examples, except as instances of the rule that you can get correct results from incorrect reasoning.

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dist-epoch ◴[] No.41847300[source]
Philosophy is quite far away from pure math for Godel's argument to really matter.
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mihaic ◴[] No.41847404[source]
Why though? You lose quite a bit of credibility when you say that theorems that apply to any system of logic don't apply to you in any way.
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1. rnhmjoj ◴[] No.41847817{3}[source]
Note that Gödel's incompleteness theorems do not apply to just any system of logic: they are about particular formal systems that can prove certain facts about the arithmetics of integers. So, for them to fail, it doesn't even take a non-mathematical formal system, just something that has nothing to do with natural numbers, for example, Euclidean geometry, which happens to be fully decidable.