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303 points FigurativeVoid | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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mihaic ◴[] No.41846803[source]
After Godel published his landmark incompleteness proof, that a logical system can't be complete and also without any internal inconsistencies, I would have expected this to trickle into philosophical arguments of this type.

I see no practical usefulness in all of these examples, except as instances of the rule that you can get correct results from incorrect reasoning.

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dist-epoch ◴[] No.41847300[source]
Philosophy is quite far away from pure math for Godel's argument to really matter.
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mihaic ◴[] No.41847404[source]
Why though? You lose quite a bit of credibility when you say that theorems that apply to any system of logic don't apply to you in any way.
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1. mjburgess ◴[] No.41847762[source]
Godel's theorem is irrelevant to systems of concepts, conceptual analysis, or theorising in general. It's narrowly about technical issues in logic.

It has been "thematically appropriated" by a certain sort of pop-philosophy, but it says nothing relevant.

Philosophy isnt the activity of trying to construct logical embeddings in deductive proofs. If any one ever thought so, then there's some thin sort of relevance, but no one ever has.