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303 points FigurativeVoid | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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jstrieb ◴[] No.41842593[source]
Relevant (deleted, as far as I can tell) tweet:

> When I talk to Philosophers on zoom my screen background is an exact replica of my actual background just so I can trick them into having a justified true belief that is not actually knowledge.

https://old.reddit.com/r/PhilosophyMemes/comments/gggqkv/get...

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CamperBob2 ◴[] No.41843302[source]
Hmm. That seems like a better example of the problem than either of the examples at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem .

The cases cited in the article don't seem to raise any interesting issues at all, in fact. The observer who sees the dark cloud and 'knows' there is a fire is simply wrong, because the cloud can serve as evidence of either insects or a fire and he lacks the additional evidence needed to resolve the ambiguity. Likewise, the shimmer in the distance observed by the desert traveler could signify an oasis or a mirage, so more evidence is needed there as well before the knowledge can be called justified.

I wonder if it would make sense to add predictive power as a prerequisite for "justified true knowledge." That would address those two examples as well as Russell's stopped-clock example. If you think you know something but your knowledge isn't sufficient to make valid predictions, you don't really know it. The Zoom background example would be satisfied by this criterion, as long as intentional deception wasn't in play.

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1. Cushman ◴[] No.41844783[source]
It’s not super clear there, but those are examples of a pre-Gettier type of argument that originally motivated strengthening, and externalizing, the J in JTB knowledge— just like you’re doing!

Gettier’s contribution — the examples with Smith — sharpens it to a point by making the “knowledge” a logical proposition — in one example a conjunction, in one a disjunction — such that we can assert that Smith’s belief in the premise is justified, while allowing the premise to be false in the world.

It’s a fun dilemma: the horns are, you can give up justification as sufficient, or you can give up logical entailment of justification.

But it’s also a bit quaint, these days. To your typical 21st century epistemologist, that’s just not a very terrifying dilemma.

One can even keep buying original recipe JTB, as long as one is willing to bite the bullet that we can flip the “knowledge” bit by changing superficially irrelevant states of the world. And hey, why not?

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2. ryanjamurphy ◴[] No.41877271[source]
> But it’s also a bit quaint, these days. To your typical 21st century epistemologist, that’s just not a very terrifying dilemma. One can even keep buying original recipe JTB [...]

Sorry, naive questions: what is a terrifying dilemma to 21st century epistemologist? What is the "modern" recipe?