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563 points joncfoo | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.235s | source
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8organicbits ◴[] No.41205729[source]
My biggest frustration with .internal is that it requires a private certificate authority. Lots of organizations struggle to fully set up trust for the private CA on all internal systems. When you add BYOD or contractor systems, it's a mess.

Using a publicly valid domain offers a number of benefits, like being able to use a free public CA like Lets Encrypt. Every machine will trust your internal certificates out of the box, so there is minimal toil.

Last year I built getlocalcert [1] as a free way to automate this approach. It allows you to register a subdomain, publish TXT records for ACME DNS certificate validation, and use your own internal DNS server for all private use.

[1] https://www.getlocalcert.net/

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yjftsjthsd-h ◴[] No.41206513[source]
Do you mean to say that your biggest frustration with HTTPS on .internal is that it requires a private certificate authority? Because I'm running plain HTTP to .internal sites and it works fine.
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lysace ◴[] No.41206577[source]
There's some every packet shall be encrypted, even in minimal private VPCs lore going on. I'm blaming PCI-DSS.
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yarg ◴[] No.41206797[source]
Blame leaked documents from the intelligence services.

No one really bothered until it was revealed that organisations like the NSA were exfiltrating unencrypted internal traffic from companies like Google with programs like PRISM.

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1. baq ◴[] No.41208794[source]
Echelon was known about before Google was even a thing. I remember people adding Usenet headers with certain keywords. Wasn’t much, but it was honest work.