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563 points joncfoo | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0.421s | source
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8organicbits ◴[] No.41205729[source]
My biggest frustration with .internal is that it requires a private certificate authority. Lots of organizations struggle to fully set up trust for the private CA on all internal systems. When you add BYOD or contractor systems, it's a mess.

Using a publicly valid domain offers a number of benefits, like being able to use a free public CA like Lets Encrypt. Every machine will trust your internal certificates out of the box, so there is minimal toil.

Last year I built getlocalcert [1] as a free way to automate this approach. It allows you to register a subdomain, publish TXT records for ACME DNS certificate validation, and use your own internal DNS server for all private use.

[1] https://www.getlocalcert.net/

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prussian ◴[] No.41206828[source]
Just be mindful that any certs you issue in this way will be public information[1] so make sure the domain names don't give away any interesting facts about your infrastructure or future product ideas. I did this at my last job as well and I can still see them renewing them, including an unfortunate wildcard cert which wasn't me.

[1] https://crt.sh/

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Helmut10001 ◴[] No.41206969[source]
Just use wildcard certs and internal subdomains remain internal information.
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qmarchi ◴[] No.41207432[source]
There's a larger risk that if someone breaches a system with a wildcard cert, then you can end up with them being able to impersonate _every_ part of your domain, not just the one application.
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1. politelemon ◴[] No.41207849[source]
It's the opposite - there is a risk, but not a larger risk. Environment traversal is easier through a certificate transparency log, there is almost zero work to do. Through a wildcard compromise, the environment is not immediately visible. It's much safer to do wildcard for certs for internal use.
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2. ixfo ◴[] No.41208276[source]
Environment visibility is easy to get. If you pwn a box which has foo.internal, you can now impersonate foo.internal. If you pwn a box which has *.internal, you can now impersonate super-secret.internal and everything else, and now you're a DNS change away from MITM across an entire estate.

Security by obscurity while making the actual security of endpoints weaker is not an argument in favour of wildcards...