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158 points kenjackson | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.209s | source
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roblabla ◴[] No.41031699[source]
This is some very poor journalism. The linux issues are so, so very different from the windows BSOD issue.

The redhat kernel panics were caused by a bug in the kernel ebpf implementation, likely a regression introduced by a rhel-specific patch. Blaming crowdstrike for this is stupid (just like blaming microsoft for the crowdstrike bsod is stupid).

For background, I also work on a product using eBPFs, and had kernel updates cause kernel panics in my eBPF probes.

In my case, the panic happened because the kernel decided to change an LSM hook interface, adding a new argument in front of the others. When the probe gets loaded, the kernel doesn’t typecheck the arguments, and so doesn’t realise the probe isn’t compatible with the new kernel. When the probe runs, shit happens and you end up with a kernel panic.

eBPF probes causing kernel panics are almost always indication of a kernel bug, not a bug in the ebpf vendor. There are exceptions of course (such as an ebpf denying access to a resource causing pid1 to crash). But they’re very few.

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mbesto ◴[] No.41032164[source]
> just like blaming microsoft for the crowdstrike bsod is stupid

Wait, how is this stupid? Unless I'm missing something, wasn't the patch part of a Microsoft payload that included an update to Crowdstrike? Surely Crowdstrike is culpable, but that doesn't completely absolve Microsoft of any responsibility, as its their payload.

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sschueller ◴[] No.41032517[source]
Microsoft should revoke the CrowdStrike driver signature and should do an internal check as to why CrowdStrike's driver was approved when it can execute arbitrary code on the kernel level without any checks. If your "driver" requires this feature MS should require CrowdStrike to submit the entire source and they should have to pay MS to do a review of the code.

What is the point of driver signing if a vendor can basically build in a back door and Microsoft doesn't validate that this back door is at least somewhat reasonable

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1. cookiengineer ◴[] No.41033699[source]
> What is the point of driver signing if a vendor can basically build in a back door and Microsoft doesn't validate that

Before you downvote that comment, I'd like to remind everyone that this was already happening. Realtek's driver cert was leaked, and a lot of malware used this cert to sign their drivers for _a decade_ until anything happened about it.

Microsoft's driver signing workflow is utterly pointless and it doesn't mean anything. Any vendor that takes their security serious should never trust those driver signatures.