Also, for Linux and especially BSD admins: has this incident affected your perspective on EDR/XDR systems in the kernel? What would you suggest as an alternative to ensure regulatory compliance?
Also, for Linux and especially BSD admins: has this incident affected your perspective on EDR/XDR systems in the kernel? What would you suggest as an alternative to ensure regulatory compliance?
What am I missing?
Edit: I know it is supposed to implement "EDR", but it's always explained in the vaguest of terms.
EDR solutions hook into the kernel to log, and block system calls. They use this information to try and generically identify malware. For example you could detect ransomware by identifying a process that is enumerating a large number of files, reading from those files, and then saving those files.
For a SOC, you can also use an EDR to identify files, hashes, connections to given IPs across your fleet of servers. This can allow you to see what devices have been compromised. The EDR can then isolate them, by blocking network syscalls and allow only the SOC to access to investigate and remediate.
This is the value they provide (or at least claim to) to a cyber team