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833 points Bluestein | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.208s | source
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mro_name ◴[] No.40715944[source]
I wonder how it can be legal to repeatedly undermine constitution and push or vote for later high-court-nullified laws and be allowed to repeat as if nothing was wrong with that. Like drunk driving forever. We ban counter-constitutional activities outside parliament and authorities. Why not inside?

I am much for 3-strikes here.

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sneak ◴[] No.40716069[source]
It’s because we aren’t actually nations of laws. There are certain groups in every nation (yes, even the ones you like or perhaps respect) who operate outside of the law as if it doesn’t exist.

The most popular “e2ee” messengers in use (WhatsApp, iMessage) are already clientside backdoored in this manner. Most people in most societies are already under this type of surveillance. This is just to tidy up the small loopholes like Signal etc.

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matthewdgreen ◴[] No.40716368[source]
> The most popular “e2ee” messengers in use (WhatsApp, iMessage) are already clientside backdoored in this manner.

No they are not. This is nonsense. The charitable interpretation is that you’re confusing the systems on iMessage that can voluntarily detect nudity and report it to you (but not the police or Apple) with the systems being proposed in TFA which have mandatory reporting to provider+police. The uncharitable interpretation is that you’re just making stuff up because it sounds good. Please don’t do either, it makes everyone worse off.

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1. sneak ◴[] No.40722281[source]
It's well documented that the complete iMessage history (if the "Messages in iCloud" feature is disabled) or the endpoint iMessage sync keys (if "Messages in iCloud" is enabled, the default), are included in the non-e2ee iCloud Backup which is non-e2ee and readable by Apple.

Approximately nobody has enabled e2ee for iCloud Backups (and approximately nobody wants to; they'd rather Apple be able to restore their photos and conversations when they've lost their phone and forgotten their password).

Each and every night when plugged in every iPhone by default makes sure that Apple receives an Apple-readable copy of all of the photos and iMessages (or iMessage cross-device sync keys) on the device.

It's not e2ee if the endpoint device escrows the plaintext. Apple and the FBI can read 99%+ of all iMessages in the world in near-realtime.

(This is because, in the usual case, the backup includes the "Messages in iCloud" cross-device endpoint synchronization keys, and Apple of course runs the sync servers that see the encrypted traffic. If you have Messages in iCloud turned off, the backup simply contains all of the iMessages directly, and Apple presumably only gets them once each 24h period when the iCloud Backup runs at night when plugged in and on wifi.)

The only case in which iMessage is e2ee is when both iMessage endpoints either have iCloud disabled, or both iMessage endpoints have iCloud Backup disabled, or both iMessage endpoints have iCloud Advanced Data Protection (backup e2ee) enabled. The moment you add an iPhone not so configured to the iMessage groupchat, the whole thing falls apart, because the defaults are to escrow the plaintext in a non-e2ee fashion.