It isn’t explicitly anti-American yet. But if it takes that tack, I’d expect Egypt, the UAE and India to drop out while leaving Malaysia in an uncomfortable place.
[1] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-...
It isn’t explicitly anti-American yet. But if it takes that tack, I’d expect Egypt, the UAE and India to drop out while leaving Malaysia in an uncomfortable place.
[1] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-...
It is certainly not pro-petrodollar.
Which, given the blood the petrodollar spills, is probably a good thing for billions of people to get behind.
America should take QUAD to the next level ASAP
As in it’s not an anachronism from the 1970s, yes. BRICS (né BRIC) wasn’t coined until 2001 [1].
BRICS expansion has essentially blunted it, as every expansion require unanimous support of [edir: the founding] all 5 members.
There's a reason Turkey (opposition from India due to it's military support for Pakistan) and Bangladesh (opposition from China due to Sheikh Hasina's dependence on India for sanction relief) weren't accepted.
Every state that has been accepted in the expansion is a state that has strong economic ties to both China and India, thus canceling out any potential bias.
- UAE's 1st and 2nd largest trade partners are China and India
- KSA's 1st and 2nd largest trade partners are China and India
- Ethiopia's 1st and 2nd largest partners are China and India.
- China is Egypt's largest import market, but India is one of Egypt's largest export market and is Egypt's credit guaranteer.
The addition of Malaysia follows this pattern as well.
BRICS has become as meaningless as APEC, because India ended up doing the same thing that China did to APEC in the 90s when Jiang Zemin unilaterally declared it cannot be a Community like the EC.
Isn’t it nine [1]?
> Every state that has been accepted in the expansion is a state that has strong economic ties to both China and India, thus canceling out any potential bias
This is true. But looking at military vulnerability, Malaysia is obviously subject to one more than the other. (China’s security relationship with Russia and Iran further undermining India.)
The founding members (in reality just China and India) are the ones with competing and diametrically opposed interests and veto each other.
> But looking at military vulnerability, Malaysia is obviously subject to one more than the other
Not severely. Indian sanctions on Malaysian imports and ban on exporting key foodstuff to Malaysia collapsed Mahathir Mohammed's government when he became overly chummy with Turkey, Pakistan, and Qatar (thus pissing off UAE and KSA as well), and has been contributing to severe inflation in Malaysia
> Iran further undermining India
India's relationship with Iran is compartmentalized to investments and it's presence in Iranian Balochistan.
Iran's only seaport located outside the Persian/Arab Gulf chokepoint is Chabahr Port, which is operated and funded by an Indian SoE. Most of the highways in Iranian Balochistan and Iranian Khorasan are Indian built and operated as well.
> China’s security relationship with Russia
It's not a unified bonhomie. A good example is the North Korea problem.
While China keeps NK on a short leash, they limit any military technology transfers to NK because CN values the relationship with SK and JP more (even despite the trade wars from the last decade).
Russia has been undermining China in NK by transferring military and nuclear technology and opening it's market to NK [0], infringing on China's near-abroad and also making it's relations with SK and JP extremely rocky (which is bad because China is trying to negotiate a FTA between CN-SK-JP, which is increasingly looking like a failure [1].
There are similar clashes in Central Asia [2], Vietnam [3], and the Sahel [4].
And Russia does use India as a negotiating tactic with China, as it was Russia that negotiated the current status quo between China and India after the Galwan Crisis almost became a regional war [5]
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The reality is, China's push for a multi-polar world only makes it harder for China to leverage it's own best interests within regional powers as well.
The same way it is very difficult for the US to get China to bend, China has a difficult time with regional powers like much of ASEAN, KSA, UAE, India, SK, JP, etc.
[0] - https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/china-and-russia-disagree-on...
[1] - https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/explained/article/3266464/tal...
[2] - https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/central-asia-russia-chi...
[3] - https://worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9781800611641_00...
[4] - https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/19/wagner-china-russia-afr...
[5] - https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/10/23/how-russia-emerged-as-k...
India doesn't want that, because India uses Russia as a mediator with China [0][1][2], and India wants to maintain the current status quo.
[0] - https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/10/23/how-russia-emerged-as-k...
[1] - https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-india-factor-in-china...
[2] - https://www.nbr.org/publication/india-and-the-quad-when-a-we...