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548 points mnot | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.204s | source
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5ersi ◴[] No.38112218[source]
If you are concerned by this proposals, then you should check out current CAs trusted by your browser - all those CAs can issue rogue certificates trusted by your browser, that can be used in MITM attack.

For example, CAs present in Firefox, that might give you pause: Beijing Certificate Authority, China Financial CA, Guang Dong CA

The CA system in browsers is inherently broken and it allows state actors to MITM you and see all your traffic if they: 1. have ability to capture IP traffic (requires cooperation with ISP) 2. have ability to generate rogue certificate via cooperation with CA

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1. supriyo-biswas ◴[] No.38112304[source]
The browser/CA forum’s requirement to log all issuances into the CT log takes care of this; the EU mandate hardly has such requirements while still mandating the inclusion of root certs. The approach of the browser/CA forum vs EIDAS cannot be equated for this reason.