> What would a perfect attacker do?
If you had physical access to the computer, some sort of bus interception to exfiltrate data from the machine.
replies(2):
If you had physical access to the computer, some sort of bus interception to exfiltrate data from the machine.
* Require a copy of the badge number, and verify that this officer is assigned and expected to be at this business right now.
* Require them to sign into and out of the site.
* Annotate which systems / compromises are in place.
- That all of the above MIGHT be sealed under a court order; I would hope any such order has an automatic 'sunset' date, and possibly renewal upon review by a different judge.
Well, that’s true in countries like Germany or the US. I suspect in somewhere like Russia or China, formal complaints are unlikely to achieve anything except invite government retaliation.
I was present when Dutch LE seized a bunch of servers on behalf of an FBI liaison officer in NL and everything went 'by the book', there is no way an LE officer without a signed order from a judge would have been granted access.
You would be 99% wrong. Even if law enforcment presented proper paperwork, every colo I have ever used would call and verify the paperwork. They might not call me, but they sure as hell would call their own lawyers. Once law enforcement is on the other side of the cage, important customers who pay real money could get compromised.
There is a massive difference between getting physical access to your server in a data center and coughing up everything about your server by simply emailing a minion in a cloud provider.
No, you don't. If they have a warrant then you need to let them in for the purposes specified in the warrant. Otherwise you're free to tell them to piss off. Unfortunately you're also free to acquiesce to any of their demands.
This kind of passive, default-compliant attitude from service providers, while understandable from a "path of least resistance" standpoint, is exactly the kind of behavior that allows the third party doctrine to circumvent so many of our basic rights. As a service provider, often the more difficult path is to challenge authority, rather than to cooperate with it. And unfortunately that means that most service providers will simply cooperate.
Any lawyer will tell you - if law enforcement attempts a warrant-less search, you tell them you do not consent to it, but you do not attempt to physically stop them from performing it. Tell them they are unwelcome and to come back with a warrant, but if they insist on entering in spite of that, you let them in.
If one morning the CEO gets an unexpected visit at home from a group of FSB agents asking for some favours, is the CEO going to say “no”? And if the CEO says “yes”, are you going to hear about it, or are they going to let the CEO continue that pretence?
Western CEOs don’t have the same worry about “accidentally” falling out of hospital windows.
Roem.ru site (small but ifluential at time) recieved official, but illegal request from high level FSB agent to disclose commentators identities. They send formal complaint to a FSB own security and to public prosecutor office. Former officially warned FSB to stoppes illegal actions.
Funny thing: 7 years later FSB agent was convicted for being CIA asset.