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658 points transpute | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.541s | source
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codedokode ◴[] No.35844123[source]
Isn't it good? Does leaked key mean that now owners of hardware will be able to read and modify the firmware, including IME, and check it for backdoors?

Such keys should be in the hands of users, not Intel.

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QuiDortDine ◴[] No.35844144[source]
If there was something to leak, it was always going to. Just a matter of when. Pretending otherwise is just security theater.
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conradev ◴[] No.35844608[source]
Yeah, it is puzzling that the key was able to be leaked in the first place. The key should have been in an HSM.
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1. er4hn ◴[] No.35845228[source]
Same thing with Samsung and their key leak.

Part of the blame, imo, lies with how clunky tools are at the lower levels. I've seen plenty of hardware based signing protocols that don't allow for key hierarchies.

Higher level tools push this along as well. Hashicorp Vault also, last I checked, doesn't allow for being a front end to an HSM. You can store the master unlock key for a Vault in an HSM, but all of the keys Vault works with will still be in Vault, in memory.