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The Dangers of Microsoft Pluton

(gabrielsieben.tech)
733 points gjsman-1000 | 1 comments | 26 Jul 22 03:46 UTC | HN request time: 1.312s | source
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Gh0stRAT ◴[26 Jul 22 06:26 UTC] No.32235028[source]▶
I'm completely missing how his example of a Word document that can only be opened by approved users on approved hardware within the corporation is supposed to be a bad thing.

Honestly, that sounds pretty fantastic. I've been using 3rd party tools/extensions to do this sort of thing in corporate and government environments for years, but having the attestation go all the way down to the hardware level is a big value-add, especially with so much ransomware/spyware/extortion/espionage going on these days.

Can someone please explain to me how the author might see this level of security as a bad thing?

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1. ctoth ◴[26 Jul 22 16:50 UTC] No.32240740[source]▶
So if I'm understanding this correctly, you'd prefer to live in the world where the Collateral Murder Wikileaks video of journalists being murdered in cold blood was never released because it was hardware locked to the original military system it was found on? Or maybe some large viral video which triggers a social uprising simply won't play. You are seriously so focused on pointless corporate secrets that you would actually consider giving the people in charge of the control over your information stream the ability to decide that something just shouldn't be shown? Because what? It might make discovery for a lawsuit more difficult? It'll make it easier to hide malfeasance? This seems particularly useful if you are trying to pretend that May 35th never happened, for instance. Terrifying, and rather icky.