I read the federal government’s Zero-Trust Memo so you don’t have to

This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

I think 3. is very harmful for actual, real-world use of Free Software. If only specific builds of software that are on a vendor-sanctioned allowlist, governed by the signature of a "trusted" party to grant them entry to said list, can meaningfully access networked services, all those who compile their own artifacts (even from completely identical source code) will be excluded from accessing that remote side/service.

Banks and media corporations are doing it today by requiring a vendor-sanctioned Android build/firmware image, attested and allowlisted by Google's SafetyNet (https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a...), and it will only get worse from here.

Remote attestation really is killing practical software freedom.

>> 3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

> I think 3. is very harmful for actual, real-world use of Free Software. If only specific builds of software that are on a vendor-sanctioned allowlist, governed by the signature of a "trusted" party to grant them entry to said list, can meaningfully access networked services, all those who compile their own artifacts (even from completely identical source code) will be excluded from accessing that remote side/service.

Is that really a problem? In practice wouldn't it just mean you can only use employer-provided and certified devices? If they want to provide their employees some Free Software-based client system, that configuration would be on the whitelist.

I think from the viewpoint of a business/enterprise environment, yes you're right, context-aware authorization is a good thing.

But I think the point of your parent comment's reply was that the inevitable adoption of this same techonology in the consumer-level environment is a bad thing. Among other things, it will allow big tech companies to have an stronger grip on what software/platforms are OK to use/not use.

If your employer forces you to, say, only use a certain version of Windows as your OS in order to do your job, that's generally acceptable to most people.

But if your TV streaming provider tells you have to use a certain version of Windows to consume their product, that's not considered acceptable to a good deal of people.

I think browser-based streaming is the only scenario impacted. Apps can already interrogate their platform and make play/no play decisions.

They are also already limiting (weakly) the max number of devices that can playback which requires some level of device identification, just not at the confidence required for authentication.

Well, the fact that I can't do credit card payments for some banks if I don't have an iphone or non rooted, google android phone is a problem which already exists.

Worse supposedly this is for security, but attackers which pulled of a privilege escalation tend to have enough ways to make sure that non of this detection finds them.

In the end it just makes sure you can't mess with your own credit card 2FA process by not allowing you to control the device you own.

> but attackers which pulled of a privilege escalation tend to have enough ways to make sure that non of this detection finds them

The point of these restrictions is to ensure that your device isn't unusually vulnerable to privilege escalation in the first place. If you let them, some users will root their phone, disable all protections, install an malware-filled Fortnite apk from a random website then stick their credit card company with the bill for fraud when their user-mangled system fails to secure their secrets.

You want to mod the shit out of your Android phone? Go ahead. Just don't expect other companies to deal with your shit, they're not obligated to deal with whatever insecure garbage you turn your phone into.

> privilege escalation in the first place.

it fails to do so in many ways, including not blocking old, no longer maintained, known to be vulnerable android releases

it also has little to do with moding and more with having a proper working free marked which allows alternatives besides Google and Apple

You're right, many secure apps don't go far enough in blocking Android releases that are probably too old & vulnerable. Not all apps are perfect, but blocking rooted and ancient devices is a start.