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656 points EthanHeilman | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.203s | source
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staticassertion ◴[] No.30102061[source]
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

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c0l0 ◴[] No.30104121[source]
I think 3. is very harmful for actual, real-world use of Free Software. If only specific builds of software that are on a vendor-sanctioned allowlist, governed by the signature of a "trusted" party to grant them entry to said list, can meaningfully access networked services, all those who compile their own artifacts (even from completely identical source code) will be excluded from accessing that remote side/service.

Banks and media corporations are doing it today by requiring a vendor-sanctioned Android build/firmware image, attested and allowlisted by Google's SafetyNet (https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a...), and it will only get worse from here.

Remote attestation really is killing practical software freedom.

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notatoad ◴[] No.30108716[source]
If you can argue that remote attestation doesn't provide additional security, then i'd love to hear that argument. but it seems like a fairly clear-cut case that it does provide additional security, and i don't think it's reasonable to accept a lower level of security for the sake of allowing unverified builds of open-source software.

there are specific contexts where you want to distribute information as widely as possible, and in those contexts it makes sense to allow any software versions to access the information. but for contexts where security is important, that means verifying the client software isn't compromised.

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1. nijave ◴[] No.30110431[source]
It can go pretty terribly sideways just like antivirus with poorly coded, proprietary, privileged agents running on end user devices collecting data.

I worked at a place that only allowed "verified" software before and it's an ongoing battle to keep that list updated. Things like digital signatures can be pretty reliable but if you're version pinning you can make it extremely difficult to quickly adopt patched versions when a vulnerability comes out.