Isn’t exposing your internal domains and systems outside VPN-gated access a risk? My understanding is this means internaltool.faang.com should now be publicly accessible.
Isn’t exposing your internal domains and systems outside VPN-gated access a risk? My understanding is this means internaltool.faang.com should now be publicly accessible.
The right way to set this stuff up is to have a strong modern VPN (preferably using WireGuard, because the implementations of every other VPN protocol are pretty unsafe) with SSO integration, and to have the applications exposed by that VPN also integrate with your SSO. Your users are generally on the VPN all day, and they're logging in to individual applications or SSH servers via Okta or Google.
"RIP VPNs" is not a great take.
A VPN is another failure layer that when it goes down all of your remote workers are hosed. The productivity losses are immense. I've seen it first-hand. The same for bastion hosts. Some tiny misconfiguration that sneaks in and everybody is fubared.
Bastion hosts and VPNs: we have better ways of protecting our valuables that's also a huge win for worker mobility and security.
We're just going to disagree about this.