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656 points EthanHeilman | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.253s | source
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uncomputation ◴[] No.30103419[source]
> “Enterprise applications should be able to be used over the public internet.”

Isn’t exposing your internal domains and systems outside VPN-gated access a risk? My understanding is this means internaltool.faang.com should now be publicly accessible.

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enriquto ◴[] No.30103558[source]
As I understand it, this sentence says that the application should be safe even if it was exposed to the public internet, not that it needs to be exposed. It is a good practice to securize everything even if visible only internally. The "perimeter defense" given by a VPN can be a plus, but never the only line of defense.
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servercobra ◴[] No.30103760[source]
The memo does say each agency needs to pick one system that is not internet accessible and make it accessible in the next year. The way I read this memo is pushing that VPNs don't add much in the way of security (if you follow the rest of the memo) and should be removed.
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1. tptacek ◴[] No.30104715[source]
The other way to read that part of the memo is that the exercise of exposing an application on the public Internet is a forcing function that will require agencies to build application security skills necessary whether or not they use VPNs. Note that the memo demands agencies find a single FISMA-Moderate service to expose.