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656 points EthanHeilman | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.299s | source
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uncomputation ◴[] No.30103419[source]
> “Enterprise applications should be able to be used over the public internet.”

Isn’t exposing your internal domains and systems outside VPN-gated access a risk? My understanding is this means internaltool.faang.com should now be publicly accessible.

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1. 3np ◴[] No.30103496[source]
There are different ways to look at it. From a defense-in-depth perspective, you are right. That is, however, one of the main points of a zero-trust environment (or you could say Zero Trust), which is a kind-of-new trend that much has been written about.

Think about it this way: In the context of ransomware attacks, a lot of times it's game over once an internal agent is compromised. The premise of zero trust is that once an attacker is "inside the wall", they gain basically nothing. Compromising one service or host would mean having no venue for escalation from there.

I wouldn't say it's objectively better (maybe by the time I retire I can make a call on that), but it's a valid strategy. Certainly better than relying on perimeter-based security like VPN alone, as opposed to it being just one layer of DiD, though.