I don't think they're being idiosyncratic. You start your post off with a paragraph that complains about how bad PGP is. Of course people will respond to that part.
I don't think PGP is that bad either. It's pretty standard asymmetric crypto. The implementations and especially the key sharing leaves a lot to be desired but for personal use I like it. And I love that there's lots of hardware key support. This is why I use it.
I personally use my hardware OpenPGP keys also for SSH, on yubikeys and OpenPGP smartcards. I also use those for encrypting and signing data. So I'm already doing something similar to start you're saying, just the other way around.
Having my keys on a hardware token is a must-have for me and I wonder if that's possible with your method. I also prefer having a token that requires a hardware input for each use like the Yubikeys can. You can set them up to require a touch for every signature or authentication. This stops a compromised server you log in to from milking your SSH agent.
But how would I store the keys in hardware if not PGP? I tried PKCS11 modules with different cards before but the software chain with middleware is pretty terrible. PGP's is pretty sane (gpg --card-edit is much more user friendly than what was offered by the other more expensive cards I used!)
And I don't like Fido2 either for this because it can't be used for content encryption/signing (which is what your blog post about)
So, I'm pretty open to doing what you're doing but my requirement for hardware key storage makes it pretty hard I think.
It would be nice to hear your thoughts on this, how this could work with hardware-backed keys.