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2603 points mattsolle | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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submeta ◴[] No.25075156[source]
Unbelievable. When I read the tweet (tried to post here as well), I suddenly realized why my Mac was unresponsive an hour ago.

Here is another tweet that describes the problem in more detail:

https://mobile.twitter.com/llanga/status/1326989724704268289

> I am currently unable to work because macOS sends hashes of every opened executable to some server of theirs and when `trustd` and `syspolicyd` are unable to do so, the entire operating system grinds to a halt.

EDIT:

As others pointed out, I put this to my `/etc/hosts` file and refreshed it like so:

    sudo emacs /etc/hosts # add `0.0.0.0 ocsp.apple.com` 
    sudo dscacheutil -flushcache; sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder # refresh hosts
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vsskanth ◴[] No.25075338[source]
Can apple not use security certificates to verify publishers ? why does it need to go to their servers ?
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loeg ◴[] No.25075733[source]
The URL mentioned in sibling comments suggests this has to do with certificate revocation (OCSP): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Prot...

I agree that breaking system availability when an OCSP server isn't available is user-hostile and unnecessary.

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valuearb ◴[] No.25075817[source]
What’s the alternative tho?
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1. loeg ◴[] No.25076057[source]
A limited change would be to fail-open more of the time, e.g., if the OCSP server does not respond within a few milliseconds. (MacOS already fails-open in some internet scenarios.)

A better option is to asynchronously update a Certificate Revocation List ("CRL") and perform any check local to the machine. This avoids disclosing to Apple every single time you run a program, which program it is, and what network you're on. It could also emergency-revoke certificates just as quickly as the OCSP design by polling at the same frequency (every app startup).

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2. valuearb ◴[] No.25076257[source]
This is exactly right, and given Apple’s privacy commitment should have been implemented already.