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1318 points xvector | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0.422s | source
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rmbryan ◴[] No.19825581[source]
Update: We have rolled out a partial fix for this issue. We generated a new intermediate certificate with the same name/key but an updated validity window and pushed it out to users via Normandy (this should be most users). Users who have Normandy on should see their add-ons start working over the next few hours. We are continuing to work on packaging up the new certificate for users who have Normandy disabled.
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inferiorhuman ◴[] No.19825665[source]
pushed it out to users via Normandy (this should be most users)

Is the existence of a back door method of updating Firefox preferences something that will be disclosed to users? What about a UI knob to disable it?

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daleharvey ◴[] No.19825686[source]
> Is the existence of a back door method of updating Firefox preferences something that will be disclosed to users?

It will even be documented for them: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox/Normandy/PreferenceRollout

> What about a UI knob to disable it?

app.normandy.enabled

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lawl ◴[] No.19825745[source]
The UI knob is

    Options -> Privacy & Security > Allow Firefox to install and run studies
They're using the studies system to push this hotfix faster for those that have it enabled.

Edit: Source:

See: https://discourse.mozilla.org/t/certificate-issue-causing-ad...

> In order to be able to provide this fix on short notice, we are using the Studies system. You can check if you have studies enabled by going to Firefox Preferences -> Privacy & Security -> Allow Firefox to install and run studies.

Normandy seems to be the internal name for this system: https://github.com/mozilla/normandy

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inferiorhuman ◴[] No.19825762[source]
No, it's not. This Normandy nonsense and stories are two separate, yet creepy features. I've already disabled stories but it looks like Mozilla still retains control of my preferences (without disclosing it).
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vesinisa ◴[] No.19825943[source]
I sure wonder how people so suspicious of Mozilla dare use their browser.
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phyzome ◴[] No.19826206[source]
Easy: There's a difference between static, shipped code and a capability to modify software at a distance (which could even by hijacked by an attacker who infiltrates Mozilla's infrastructure.)
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1. calcifer ◴[] No.19826756[source]
If your threat model includes the hijacking of Mozilla's infrastructure, I assume you read and verify the entirety of the Firefox source with every new version before using it, right?
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2. phyzome ◴[] No.19836545[source]
Obviously not?

But there are trustworthy people working with and integrating that code, there's a good chance they'll notice a hinky commit, and they're very close to having completely reproducible builds—which means that there can be verification that the shipped binary matches the inspected source.

https://gregoryszorc.com/blog/2018/06/20/deterministic-firef...