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1318 points xvector | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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needle0 ◴[] No.19823806[source]
I’ll still keep using Firefox since I recognize the importance of browser diversity and the hazards of a Chrome monoculture (that and vertical tabs), but, yikes.

Still, this type of oversight seems all too common even in large companies. I remember several cases from Fortune 500 companies in the past few years alone. What would be a good way to automate checking for them? Has anyone developed a tool designed specifically to avoid certificate expiry disasters?

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_wmd ◴[] No.19823848[source]
Let's not forget multiple mobile networks across Europe went down on the same day last year because Ericsson(?) let a cert expire on some internal management system that had not been updated. SSL cert renewal is one of the great unsolved problems in computer science

edit: not Europe, just UK and Japan apparently: https://www.zdnet.com/article/ericsson-expired-certificate-c...

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AmericanChopper ◴[] No.19824709[source]
>SSL cert renewal is one of the great unsolved problems in computer science

Certificate expiry really only exists to make money for CAs. It doesn’t solve any security problem that CRLs don’t already solve (and solve better). There’s lots of unsolved problems relating to ‘how do you make a reliable PKI’, but cert expiry is really just an unrelated business requirement for CAs.

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1. kevingadd ◴[] No.19824751[source]
I'd argue it's a blunt hammer extra layer of defense, where if a certificate gets compromised and the owner never finds out at least it eventually stops working. This kind of compromise is pretty common.