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1124 points CrankyBear | 3 comments | | HN request time: 0.649s | source
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woodruffw ◴[] No.45891521[source]
I’m an open source maintainer, so I empathize with the sentiment that large companies appear to produce labor for unpaid maintainers by disclosing security issues. But appearance is operative: a security issue is something that I (as the maintainer) would need to fix regardless of who reports it, or would otherwise need to accept the reputational hit that comes with not triaging security reports. That’s sometimes perfectly fine (it’s okay for projects to decide that security isn’t a priority!), but you can’t have it both ways.
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Msurrow ◴[] No.45891613[source]
My takeaway from the article was not that the report was a problem, but a change in approach from Google that they’d disclose publicly after X days, regardless of if the project had a chance to fix it.

To me its okay to “demand” from a for profit company (eg google) to fix an issue fast. Because they have ressources. But to “demand” that an oss project fix something with a certain (possibly tight) timeframe.. well I’m sure you better than me, that that’s not who volunteering works

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vadansky ◴[] No.45891699[source]
On the other hand as an ffmpeg user do you care? Are you okay not being told a tool you're using has a vulnerability in it because the devs don't have time to fix it? I mean someone could already be using the vulnerability regardless of what Google does.
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afiori ◴[] No.45891975[source]
This is a fantastic argument for the universe where Google does not disclose vulnerability until the maintainers had had reasonable time to fix it.

In this world the user is left vulnerable because attackers can use published vulnerabilities that the maintainers are to overwhelmed to fix

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esrauch ◴[] No.45892177[source]
This program discloses security issues to the projects and only discloses them after they have had a "reasonable" chance to fix it though, and projects can request extensions before disclosure if projects plan to fix it but need more time.

Google runs this security program even on libraries they do not use at all, where it's not a demand, it's just whitehat security auditing. I don't see the meaningful difference between Google doing it and some guy with a blog doing it here.

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XorNot ◴[] No.45893357[source]
Google is a multi-billion dollar company, which is paying people to find these bugs in the first place.

That's a pretty core difference.

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tpmoney ◴[] No.45895376[source]
Great, so Google is actively spending money on making open source projects better and more secure. And for some reason everyone is now mad at them for it because they didn't also spend additional money making patches themselves. We can absolutely wish and ask that they spend some money and resources on making those patches, but this whole thing feels like the message most corporations are going to take is "don't do anything to contribute to open source projects at all, because if you don't do it just right, they're going to drag you through the mud for it" rather than "submit more patches"
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samus ◴[] No.45897419[source]
Why should Google not be expected to also contribute fixes to a core dependency of their browser, or to help funding the developers? Just publishing bug reports by themselves does not make open source projects secure!
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1. walletdrainer ◴[] No.45898103[source]
Google does do that.

This bit of ffmpeg is not a Chrome dependency, and likely isn’t used in internal Google tools either.

> Just publishing bug reports by themselves does not make open source projects secure!

It does, especially when you first privately report them to the maintainers and give them a plenty of time to fix the bug.

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2. Orygin ◴[] No.45898853[source]
It doesn't if you report lots of "security" issues (like this 25 years old bug) and give too little time to fix them.

Nobody is against Google reporting bugs, but they use automatic AI to spam them and then expect a prompt fix. If you can't expect the maintainers to fix the bug before disclosure, then it is a balancing act: Is the bug serious enough that users must be warned and avoid using the software? Will disclosing the bug now allow attackers to exploit it because no fix has been made?

In this case, this bug (imo) is not serious enough to warrant a short disclosure time, especially if you consider *other* security notices that may have a bigger impact. The chances of an attacker finding this on their own and exploiting it are low, but now everybody is aware and you have to rush to update.

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3. walletdrainer ◴[] No.45899087[source]
The timeline here is pretty long, and Google will provide an extension if you ask.

What do you believe would be an appropriate timeline?

>especially if you consider other security notices that may have a bigger impact.

This is a bug in the default config that is likely to result in RCE, it doesn’t get that much worse than this.